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I. Introduction 
   Jane is eleven years old, entering the fifth grade, and has a learning disability.  She 
meets the definition of handicapped under 20 USC §1401(1). 1 The public school Jane attended 
proposed in her individualized educational plan that she continue to attend the public school with 
once a week one-on-one evaluation.  Jane’s parents felt that the placement was inadequate given 
her disability and challenged the school’s determination.  Her parents placed her in a private 
school that provided individualized education for learning disabled children. They requested due 
process hearings to dispute the placement the school district deemed appropriate.2   The hearing 
officer found the placement the public school had provided to be inadequate. The school district 
appealed the administrative decision to the federal district court, which reversed and found the 
public school placement to be adequate.    
Jane’s parents continue their fight and appeal to the circuit court of appeals.  In the 
interim, a placement dilemma arises: what should Jane’s parents do about her schooling?  Most 
likely they would prefer to keep her in the private setting, which they believe is the best place for 
her.  Furthermore, at the administrative level the private school placement has been found as 
providing appropriate education. This decision may be difficult, however if they will not be 
reimbursed for the tuition during the time the appeal is pending.  Jane’s parents only option if the 
stay-put provision does not apply during the appeal, would be to place her in the public school 
that the lower court found appropriate simply because they could not afford to keep her in the 
private school during the appeal.  However, this would be unsatisfying because there is a 
possibility that the court of appeals would reverse and find the private school as the appropriate 
                                                 
1 20 U.S.C §1401(1) (1990) (“Handicapped” as defined in Individuals with Disabilities Education Act). 
2 See 20 U.S.C § 1415 (b)(6)(2004); 34 C.F.R § 300.506 (2007). 
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setting.  Keeping Jane in the private setting during the appeal is in her best interest because she 
would not be moved from school to school, and she would have consistency while the placement 
dispute is ultimately resolved.  
The “stay-put” provision in 20 U.S.C § 1415 (j) would seem to have answered the 
question of what to do with Jane in the middle of all the back and forth of the litigation: literally 
to “stay-put” in the current school placement until “all such proceedings have been completed.”3  
From the plain language of the statute, it would appear that all “proceedings” would encompass 
all judicial proceedings—including appeals to the circuit courts for final determination.   
However, there is a circuit split as to the meaning of the language in 20 U.S.C § 1415 (j), 
with circuits reading the language either broadly or narrowly.4  Specifically, with some courts 
implementing the stay put provision between appeals from the district level to the circuit level, 
while other courts limiting it to the district level only.5  The reading of the statute has a real 
effect on the daily lives of disabled children throughout the United States. Circuits that read the 
language narrowly limit access to free appropriate education, a right that all disabled students 
have in this country.  Moreover, the right to appeal is limited by the narrow reading.  
This note addresses the current circuit split on deciding when pendency ends with the 
“stay-put” provision and what “all such proceedings” entails.  This note argues that the pendency 
should not end until the final resolution through the entire judicial process, including at the 
circuit level.  Further this note maintains that from the plain language of the stay-put provision, it 
                                                 
3 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2006) (Maintenance of current educational placement: “Except as provided in subsection 
(k)(4), during the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or local 
educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement 
of the child, or, if applying for initial admission to a public school, shall, with the consent of the parents, be placed 
in the public school program until all such proceedings have been completed.”). 
   
4 Compare M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 112, 125 (3d Cir. 2014); with Andersen v. Dist. of Columbia, 877 
F.2d 1018, 1023-24 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
5 Id.   
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is evident that the Congressional intent was to provide students to remain “stay-put” during the 
entire appeal process including review by the circuit courts.  Part II of this note describes the 
relevant background of the main laws that give students with disabilities access to free 
appropriate education6 through the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) and the 
Department of Education regulations.7  Part III addresses the conflicting case law that has 
interpreted the stay-put provision and created a circuit split.8   Part IV analyzes the Supreme 
Court precedent on IDEA.  Finally, Part V argues that the courts should read the language of the 
stay-put provision broadly in order to allow disabled students to remain in their current 
placements through all final appeals.  Reading the provision broadly protects the right of 
disabled students to free appropriate public education.  Additionally, the Congressional intent of 
the Act supports the premise that stay-put provision protects disabled students placement through 
the circuit level. 
II. Relevant background 
a. IDEA and FAPE 
One of the fundamental values in this country is access to education for all.9  Although 
the Constitution does not explicitly grant a right to education,10 it is nonetheless considered of 
great importance for the advancement of the individual and society as a whole in this country.11  
Traditionally, those with access to formal education have been able to secure jobs and contribute 
                                                 
6 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2004); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2004). 
 
7 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2004) 
8 Compare M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 112, 125 (3d Cir. 2014); with Andersen v. Dist. of Columbia, 877 
F.2d 1018, 1023-24 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
9 See generally Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)(“In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining 
the fabric of our society.”).    
 
10 See generally Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (“Education, of course, is not among 
the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.”). 
 
11 See generally Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).   
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to the national economy.12   The majority of students in the United States attend public school 
with thousands of dollars spent on both the students and the systems per student, such as teachers 
that support them.13       
There is also the option, for some, of private schooling.  In the United States, about ten 
percent of elementary and secondary school students are enrolled in private schools. 14  The 
average cost of private schooling can cost as much as a year of college tuition.15  While private 
schooling for most students is an option or lifestyle choice by their parents, for disabled students 
it is sometimes a necessity.  Private schooling for a disabled child may be a necessity if the 
public school does not meet their educational needs.  In the United States, approximately thirteen 
percent of students have disabilities.16 Although many disabled students would like to receive 
their education at public schools, if the schools cannot give the disabled child the appropriate 
education they are entitled to, they must look to the private alternative.   
      The federal government entitles every child with a disability to “free appropriate 
public education.”17  Congress passed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) 
in 197518 to provide that all children with disabilities have free appropriate public education 
                                                 
12 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 620 (1995) (“Scholars estimate that nearly a quarter of America's economic 
growth in the early years of this century is traceable directly to increased schooling.”) 
13 Carole Feldman, Education In America: Facts And Figures As Students Head Back To School, Aug. 31, 2013  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/31/education-in-america_n_3849110.html 
14 Digest of Education Statistics: 2012, U.S. Department of Education Institute of Education Sciences National 
Center for Education Statistics (Dec. 2013), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d12/  
15 Emily Driscoll, Private School Education: Worth the Cost?, Fox Business (April 27, 2012), 
http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2012/04/27/private-school-education-worth-cost/  
16   How many students with disabilities are in our school(s)?, Center for Public Education http://www.data-
first.org/data/how-many-students-with-disabilities-are-in-our-schools/  
 
 
17 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A)(2004).  
 
18 20 U.S.C § 1400; Dennis Fan, No Idea What the Future Holds: The Retrospective Evidence Dilemma, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 1503, 1507 (2014) 
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(“FAPE”).19  Originally, IDEA was called the Education of the Handicapped Act (“EHA”) and 
was the result of various congressional studies that found that disabled children were being 
excluded from public schools throughout the United States.20  Under the Act, FAPE is provided 
if the services for special education are provided for free to the disabled student, the services 
appropriately meet the state standards, and they conform to the individualized educational plan 
(“IEP”).21   
Approximately six million students are protected under IDEA in the United States.22  
Services are available to children who need them through IDEA to help their learning regardless 
of their disability.  Early intervention services are available from birth to age two for infants and 
toddlers with disabilities under IDEA Part C.23  For those ages three to twenty-one, IDEA Part B 
provides those special education services.24  Various regulations and laws regulate access to 
FAPE.25  To achieve participation with IDEA, the federal government provides funds to 
                                                 
19 20 U.S.C. § 1400.  
20 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (c)(2) (2004).  
21 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18); See Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 
367-68, (1985) (The Act defines a ‘free appropriate public education’ to mean ‘special education and related 
services which (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision   and direction, and without 
charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or 
secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with [an] individualized 
education program.’’).  
 
  
 
22 Dennis Fan, No Idea What the Future Holds: The Retrospective Evidence Dilemma, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1503, 
1507 (2014) 
 
 
 
23 Building the Legacy: IDEA 2004, United States Department of Education http://idea.ed.gov/  
24 Id.  
25 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f); 34 CFR 300.518 
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participating districts.26  Currently, all fifty states, eight territories, the District of Columbia and 
schools supported by the Bureau of Indian Affairs provide programs or services through IDEA.27 
The Congressional intent behind IDEA was to fulfill the goal of FAPE.28  The long-term 
goal, of providing FAPE to children with disabilities, was to prepare them for “further education, 
employment, and independent living.”29  School districts have the duty to comply with IDEA and 
ensure that FAPE is provided to students who require special education.30  Schools that receive 
federal funds must comply with IDEA and ensure that all disabled children are receiving the 
education mandated by the act.31 In fact, besides the No Child Left Behind fund, IDEA is the 
second largest federally funded state grant.32 
Implementing IDEA in schools is a process with various steps and procedural 
safeguards.33  First, a specialist usually in the school, classifies a student as needing additional 
services or an individualized educational program (“IEP”).34  Second, school personnel meet 
with the child’s parents to formulate the IEP, as required by IDEA.35 Under the IEP, which 
                                                 
26 See Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985).  
  
 
27 U.S. Department of Education, Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, Thirty-five Years of 
Progress in Educating Children with Disabilities Through IDEA, (2010),  
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osers/idea35/history/idea-35-history.pdf.  
28 See Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter by & Through Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 12 (1993) (“Congress intended that 
IDEA's promise of a "free appropriate public education" for disabled children would normally be met by an IEP's 
provision for education in the regular public schools or in private schools chosen jointly by school officials and 
parents.”).     
29 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2004).  
30 See Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1522 (9th Cir. 1992); See also W.G. v. Bd. Of Trustees of Target 
Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1486 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that IDEA gives the responsibility of the IEP 
process to the state and local educational agencies). 
31 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2004).  
32 School Finance Federal, State, and Local K-12 School Finance Overview, (Apr. 21, 2014 22:59), 
http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/school-finance 
33 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2004).  
34 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2004).  
35 Burlington, 471 U.S. at 368 (“The IEP is in brief a comprehensive statement of the educational needs of a 
handicapped child and the specially designed instruction and related services to be employed to meet those needs. § 
1401(19). The IEP is to be developed jointly by a school official qualified in special education, the child's teacher, 
the parents or guardian, and, where appropriate, the child. In several places, the Act emphasizes the participation of 
9 
 
should be individualized to meet the student’s needs, the student may be required to be taken out 
of the regular classroom setting for individualized help.36  The IEP must include: the current 
level of educational performance the student is at; the benchmarks or goals for the student; the 
services that are to be provided; and whether the student will participate in the general education 
program with other students.37  Under IDEA, “special education” means “specially designed 
instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a child with a 
disability, including instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and 
institutions, and in other settings.”38  Most importantly, the IEP must include how the district will 
provide FAPE to the student.39 
The participation of the child’s parents or guardians is paramount throughout the entire 
process.40   The parents have the right to inspect all documents pertaining to the IEP and obtain 
an evaluation by someone independent of the school.41  When the IEP is satisfactory to the 
parents, the program continues.  However, when the parents are dissatisfied with the IEP, they 
have the right to challenge it.42   
                                                                                                                                                             
the parents in developing the child's educational program and assessing its effectiveness.”); See 
also §§1400(c), 1401(19), 1412(7), 1415(b)(1)(A), (C), (D), (E), and 1415(b)(2); 34 CFR § 300.345 (1984). 
 
36 Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter by & Through Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 10 (1993) (describing the process)  
37 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d) (framework is detailed in statute).  
 
38 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16); See Amanda J. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2001) 
39 20 U.S.C. § 1414 
40 Burlington, 471 U.S. at 368-69. (“Section 1415(b) entitles the parents ‘to examine all relevant records with respect 
to the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the child,’ to obtain an independent educational 
evaluation of the child, to notice of any decision to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational 
placement of the child, and to present complaints with respect to any of the above.”). 
  
 
41 Id. at 369. 
42 See 20 U.S.C. 1415; Id. at 368.  
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IDEA provides the procedural safeguards to challenge the IEP.43  Specifically, IDEA 
provides the FAPE provision will be ensured for students through the guaranteed procedural 
safeguards.44  The process begins with a complaint and then a preliminary hearing where the 
parents discuss their concerns with the local educational agency in hopes of reaching an 
agreement.45 The agency has thirty days to resolve the issue to the satisfaction of the parents.46  
If the agency has not resolved the issue within that time, the parents have the right to request an 
impartial due process hearing.47  Usually the local educational agency or the state educational 
agency conduct the due process hearing.48 The hearing officer conducts the hearing and makes 
the determination as to whether the student is receiving FAPE.49  After the administrative review, 
the parties then have the right to have a state or federal court review the administrative 
decision.50   
Under IDEA, “any party” can challenge the hearing’s findings or decision “in any State 
court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States, without regard to the 
amount in controversy.”51 This means that either the school district or the parents can challenge 
the administrative decision.  Courts have noted that the judicial review of IDEA claims is 
“substantially” different than other reviews of agencies in that it is far less deferential to lower 
decisions.52  The main procedures that differ from the standard appellate review are the 
                                                 
43 Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525, (2007); See 20 § U.S.C 1415   
  
44 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). 
45 20 § U.S.C 1415(f) (1) (B)(i)(IV); Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 525. 
46 Id.  
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
49 Id.  
50 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2004).  
51 Id.  
 
52 Amanda J. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 887 (9th Cir. 2001) (Congress intended ‘judicial review in 
IDEA cases [to] differ[]substantially from judicial review of other agency actions, in which courts generally are 
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evidentiary and remedial procedures.53  The reviewing courts can hear more evidence by the 
requesting party than usually allowed by the evidence rules and award the relief the court finds is 
appropriate.54    
There can be various issues that arise in regards to the placement of a child with a 
disability during the review period or appeal of the initial determination.55  Under IDEA, there is 
a provision that states that “during the pendency of a proceeding” the child is entitled to stay in 
his “current educational setting.”56  In other words, where the disabled child was being educated 
at the time of the first dispute of the IEP or placement is where the child should remain unless 
the parties agree otherwise.57  The provision is known as the “stay-put” provision, and it is meant 
to protect the child’s “then-current educational placement” until all proceedings are complete.58   
However, the stay-put provision does not come into play in every situation that involves a 
placement change.59  Unilateral placement by parents can affect reimbursement.60  Take the 
situation in which the child is moved from public to private school, and a violation of IDEA is 
filed against the school district much like Jane’s parents in the introduction.  If the hearing 
officer finds that the original public school placement provided FAPE, then the parents will not 
                                                                                                                                                             
confined to the administrative record and are held to a highly deferential standard of review.’”)(citing Ojai Unified 
Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 1993)).    
53 Id.   
54 Id.  
55 M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 112, 117 (3d Cir. 2014) (“A variety of disputes may arise concerning 
placement. For example, the parents may argue for removing the child from public school because they believe the 
services are inadequate. Or the school district might argue for the same result, over the parents' objection, because it 
considers the child too disruptive to be in a regular school setting. Alternatively, either party could be 
advocating for public-school placement — with the school district insisting that an expensive specialized private 
school is unnecessary or the parents insisting that participation in a regular classroom is essential for their child's 
development.”). 
56 Id. at 115; See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).    
57 Id.  
58 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).   
59  M.R., 744 F.3d at 118.   
60 Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter by & Through Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993). 
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be entitled to reimbursement unless the decision is later reversed.61 If neither the hearing officer 
nor district court finds that the school district violated IDEA by not providing FAPE, then the 
parents move to private school was unilateral and reimbursement would be unavailable.62   
Agreement by all parties can also implement the new placement as being governed by the 
stay-put provision.63  In other words, “[h]aving been endorsed by the State, the move to private 
school is no longer the parents unilateral action, and the child is entitled to ‘stay-put’ at the 
private school for the duration of the dispute.”64   In addition, there are other regulations that 
protect the child’s placement when the initial decision by the hearing officer supports the parents 
who are seeking a change of placement.65  The decision in the administrative process or by a 
court later that affirms the parent’s decision that the child should be in a private setting will not 
be considered a unilateral action by the parents.66 
Although the cost of educating a student in private schooling is substantial, if the public 
school district provides FAPE, the district will not be subject to the cost.67  However, once there 
                                                 
 
 
61 See Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S. By & Through Heidi S., 96 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1996). 
  
 
62 Id.   
63 M.R., 744 F.3d at 118-19 (“The new placement can become the educational setting protected by the stay-put rule 
if the parents and "the State or local educational agency" agree to the change.”).  
 
64 Id. at 119. 
65 34 CFR § 300.518 (d) (2006) (“If the hearing officer in a due process hearing conducted by the SEA or a State 
review official in an administrative appeal agrees with the child's parents that a change of placement is appropriate, 
that placement must be treated as an agreement between the State and the parents for purposes of paragraph (a) of 
this section.”).    
66 M.R., 744 F.3d at 119 (“Having been endorsed by the State, the move to private school is no longer the parents' 
unilateral action, and the child is entitled to "stay-put" at the private school for the duration of the dispute resolution 
proceedings.”).   
67 Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter by & Through Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993) (“There is no doubt that 
Congress has imposed a significant financial burden on States and school districts that participate in IDEA. Yet 
public educational authorities who want to avoid reimbursing parents for the private education of a disabled child 
can do one of two things: give the child a free appropriate public education in a public setting, or place the child in 
an appropriate private setting of the State's choice. This is IDEA's mandate, and school officials who conform to it 
need not worry about reimbursement claims.”).     
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is a violation of IDEA, reimbursement for private school costs is appropriate because without the 
alternative to public education the disabled child would not be provided with FAPE.68  If 
disabled students were not protected by IDEA and had to pay for private school because the 
public education did not provide appropriate education, then the students would not be receiving 
free appropriate education.  The courts have discretion in dispensing the equitable relief, and 
they can limit reimbursement to what it deems reasonable.69  That means that if the private 
school tuition is deemed unreasonably expensive, the courts have the authority to limit the 
amount reimbursed.70 
b. The Stay-Put Provision  
The stay-put provision in the IDEA act is a powerful provision to protect the educational 
placement of the child.   The stay-put provision acts as a preliminary injunction that does not 
require the usual showing of irreparable harm when there is a dispute about the placement of a 
student.71  The stay-put provision performs like an automatic injunction protecting the student’s 
current educational placement.72  The provision explicitly provides that during the “pendency” or 
time it takes for final resolution the disabled child “shall” or must stay in their current 
educational setting.73     
The stay-put provision has protected all types of students and at the highest level of the 
judiciary.  The Supreme Court has deliberated the meaning of the stay-put requirement, and it 
                                                 
68 Id. at 15-16; 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2).  
69 Id. (“Courts fashioning discretionary equitable relief under IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the 
appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required. Total reimbursement will not be 
appropriate if the court determines that the cost of the private education was unreasonable.”).    
70 Id.  
71 Joshua A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., 559 F.3d 1036, 1037 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A motion for stay-put functions as 
an ‘automatic’ preliminary injunction, meaning that the moving party need not show the traditionally required 
factors (e.g., irreparable harm) in order to obtain preliminary relief.”). 
 
 
72 Id. at 1037. 
73 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j)   
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has found the scope of the requirement to be substantial.74  Even students who may be 
considered dangerous have been protected by the stay-put provision, and they must remain in 
their current placement.75   
Congress amended IDEA in 1997 to include that unless agreed otherwise between the 
parents and the state or local agency, the student had to remain “in the then current educational 
placement” during the pendency of any proceeding. 76  This provision reflects the concern 
Congress had with disabled students being forced out of public schools prior to the enactment of 
IDEA.  
The United States Department of Education establishes the federal educational policies 
and administers most of the federal assistance to education.77  Congress created the Department 
in 1975 with specific purposes, such as building the federal commitment to schools to provide 
access to education for all students equally and to help the States improve the quality of 
education.78  Another main purpose was to “to increase the accountability of Federal education 
programs to the President, the Congress, and the public.”79  In 2010, the Department’s budget 
                                                 
74 Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988). 
 
75 Id.  
76 Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Construction and Application of Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1400 et seq.—Supreme Court Cases, 13 A.L.R. FED. 2D 321 (2006) “In 1997, Congress amended § 615 
of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C.A. § 1415) to provide, in relevant part, that except 
during the pendency of an appeal from an interim placement of a child, a child must remain in the then current 
educational placement during the pendency of any proceedings under § 1415 unless the state or local educational 
agency and the parents otherwise agree (20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(j)).”  
  
 
77 An Overview of the U.S. Department of Education, U.S. Department of Education (Sept. 2010),  
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/focus/what_pg2.html. 
78 Id.  
79 Id.; See Section 102, Public Law 96-88.  
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was about $60 billion with 4,300 employees.80  The Office of Special Education Programs at the 
United States Department of Education guides the implementation of IDEA.81  
The Department of Education’s stay-put regulation includes language of pendency that 
covers “any administrative or judicial proceeding regarding a due process complaint.”82  The 
language also mandates that unless otherwise agreed upon between the parents and state, the 
child “involved in the complaint must remain” in the placement that they were in at the time of 
due process complaint.83   
III. Case Law and the Circuit Split 
Circuits are currently split on the issue of whether the stay-put provision in an IDEA 
dispute applies through the pendency of a district court decision or appeal to the circuit court of 
appeals.84  In most cases, this means that the issue is whether a child can remain in the school 
while a parent appeals a federal district court decision to the circuit court of appeals. The Sixth 
Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit have held that the pendency terminates at the district 
court level.85  This narrow reading would mean that the district court’s judgment would be the 
final judgment.  The implication would be that parents who wanted to appeal that court’s 
decision on their child’s placement would have no right to reimbursement between the district 
trial level and the appeal to the circuit level.  The Third and Ninth Circuits have held that the 
pendency applies through final resolution of the dispute including appeals to the circuit court of 
                                                 
80 Id.  
81 IDEA—the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Center for Parent Information and Resources (May 2014), 
http://www.parentcenterhub.org/repository/idea/. 
82 34 CFR 300.518 
83 34 CFR 300.518(a) (“during the pendency of any administrative or judicial proceeding regarding a due process 
complaint…, unless the state or local agency and the parents of the child agree otherwise, the child involved in the 
complaint must remain in his or her current educational placement.”).  
84 Compare M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 112, 125 (3d Cir. 2014); with Andersen v. Dist. of Columbia, 877 
F.2d 1018, 1023-24 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
85 Andersen v. Dist. of Columbia, 877 F.2d 1018, 1023-24 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ((holding that Congress did not intend 
stay-put financing to cover federal appellate review); Kari H by & Through Dan H. v. Franklin Special Sch. 
Dist.,1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21724(6th Cir. Tenn.Aug. 13, 1997).   
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appeals.86  The stay-put provision would remain in place until the circuit court’s final 
determination, and the child would be entitled to stay-put provision protection and 
reimbursement during that time under this reading of the Act.   
a. The Stay-Put Provision ends at the District Level 
In Anderson v. District of Columbia, the court consolidated four cases that involved four 
children with learning disabilities and their parents.87  The school districts proposed that the 
children be placed in public schools for learning disabled but the parents rejected the placement, 
and enrolled their children in private schools that had full-time special education programs.88  
The parents had due process hearings in which the district initially was ordered to pay the tuition 
of the private school however, after the district again proposed the public school placement, the 
hearing officer found it appropriate and denied tuition reimbursement.89  The parents appealed to 
the district court, which denied their appeal and also refused to issue a “stay-put” injunction 
while the parents appealed to the circuit court.90   
The Anderson court rejected the view that the “stay-put” language in U.S.C. § 1415(e) 
“all such proceedings” meant all proceedings including appeal to the circuit court and petition of 
                                                 
86 M.R., 744 F.3d at 125 (“Having now considered the question, we agree with the Ninth Circuit — and the district 
court in this case — that the statutory language and the ‘protective purposes’ of the stay-put provision lead to the 
conclusion that Congress intended stay-put placement to remain in effect through the final resolution of the 
dispute.”).  
 
87 Andersen by Andersen v. D.C., 877 F.2d 1018, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1989).   
  
 
 
88 Id. at 1020. (For school year 1986–87 the school district proposed that each of the three be placed in public 
schools for learning disabled children—Buchanan Learning Center, a secondary school, for Joshua Andersen and 
James Bowers, and Prospect Learning Center, an elementary school, for Jason McMullen. The parents rejected the 
school district's proposed placements and enrolled their children in private facilities providing full-time special 
education programs.)  
  
89 Id.   
  
90 Id. 
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certiorari to the Supreme Court.91  The court reasoned that section § 1415(e)(2) only referenced 
due process hearings, state administrative review and civil actions in state or district court.92  The 
court also referenced Honig v. Doe,93 noting that the Supreme Court in that case found that one 
of Congress’ purposes in enacting § 1415(e)(3) was to prevent the schools from unilaterally 
excluding disabled children from public schools,94 and, as a result, once a district court had 
found the placement appropriate the “change [was] no longer the consequence of a unilateral 
decision by school authorities.95  The court ultimately held that once a district court has found 
the placement appropriate, the only recourse for the parents would be to move for a traditional 
injunction outside the stay-put provision.96  Ultimately, without the stay-put provision 
protections beyond the district level, the parents would not be reimbursed the expense of the 
private schooling for any appeals after the district level. 
Another decision that read the stay-put language narrowly came from the Sixth Circuit.97  
In Kari H. By & Through Dan H. v. Franklin Special Sch. Dist, the plaintiff, who was severely 
disabled, appealed the district court’s judgment upholding an administrative law judge’s order, 
                                                 
91 Andersen, 877 F.2d at 1023. (We reject this view as inconsistent with the statutory language and the case law). 
  
92 Id. (The “section,” 1415, speaks of only three types of proceedings: due process hearings, state administrative 
review where available, and civil actions for review brought “in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a 
district court of the United States.”); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). 
  
93  Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) 
 
 
94 Andersen, 877 F.2d at 1023-24. (“the Supreme Court considered a contention that school districts should be 
entitled to change a child's placement, despite § 1415(e)(3), when the child's presence posed a danger to others; the 
Court made clear that the section was intended to protect children from unilateral displacement by school 
authorities.”). 
  
 
95 Id. at 1024. 
96 Id. (“Once a district court has resolved the issue of appropriate placement, the child is entitled to an injunction 
only outside the stay-put provision, i.e., by establishing the usual grounds for such relief. Plaintiffs here have 
attempted no such showing.”) 
  
97 Kari H. By & Through Dan H. v. Franklin Special Sch. Dist., 125 F.3d 855 (6th Cir. 1997).  
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placing the plaintiff in a self-contained special education classroom for five hours a day.98 The 
plaintiff moved the district court to enjoin the district under the stay-put provision from 
implementing the decision pending the outcome of the circuit court’s decision.99   
The Sixth Circuit found no error in the district court’s finding in placement and 
affirmed.100  The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the stay-put provision because 
the section listed the three types of proceedings as due process hearings, state administrative 
reviews, and civil actions brought in either state or federal district court.101  The court stated that 
“[i]f Congress wanted the provision to apply to circuit courts, it certainly could have said so.”102  
The court read the appeal process as only being limited to either the state or federal district court 
because of the language in the stay-put provision.103  The court also referenced the Honig v. Doe 
Supreme Court case as illustrating the purpose of the stay-put provision to protect children from 
unilateral displacement by school officials.104  Finding that the purpose of the act would not be 
implicated in the case because the district court approved the placement by the school, 105 the 
court noted the change of placement was not a unilateral change by the school.106  
a. Criticism of the Narrow Reading of the Stay-put Provision  
                                                 
98 Id.  
  
 
99 Id. (“Plaintiff subsequently filed another complaint in the district court seeking to temporarily enjoin defendant, 
pursuant to the IDEA's stay-put provision, from implementing the ALJ's order pending review of the district court's 
decision by this court.”); See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513 (1996).  
  
 
100 Id.  
101 Kari, 125 F.3d at 855. 
 
102 Id. 
 
103 Id.  
104 Id.  
105 Id.  
106 Kari, 125 F.3d at 855. 
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Other circuits have analyzed the stay-put provision and found that it applies through the 
entire appeals process including circuit review.107  In Joshua A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., the 
court addressed the issue of a disabled student seeking a stay-put reimbursement for education 
incurred during the appeal to the Ninth Circuit.108  The plaintiff’s “current educational 
placement”109 that was implemented in the IEP was being provided to the child at his home for 
forty hours a week.110  The child was being provided with in-home educational services during 
his appeal to the Ninth Circuit and sought for the district to continue to co-pay during the appeal 
process.111  The court read the statute broadly, finding that since the statute allows a  “civil 
action” to be brought to a district court, the circuit courts have jurisdiction because they hear 
appeals from final judgments of district courts pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1291.112   
The court also pointed out that the Department of Education regulation stated “during the 
pendency of any administrative or judicial proceeding.”113  The court emphasized the 
Department of Education regulation required the same result by including the language “during 
the pendency of any […] judicial proceeding.”114    
                                                 
107 See Joshua A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., 559 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2009); M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 
112 (3d Cir. 2014)   
108 559 F.3d 1036, 1037 (9th Cir. 2009).   
  
 
109 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (j) 
110 Joshua, 559 F.3d at 1037.   
 
111 Id.   
112 Id. at 1038. (“Civil actions under the IDEA may be brought in federal district courts. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). 
Circuit courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judgments of district courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
  
 
113 Id.   
 
114 Id.; See 34 C.F.R. § 300.518(a)(emphasis added). 
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While the court acknowledged that Section 1415(j) listed four kinds of proceedings,115 it 
did not confine its interpretation to those.  The Ninth Circuit correctly determined that because 
civil actions could be brought to district courts and circuit courts had jurisdiction to hear appeals 
from district courts, the stay-put provision applied during appeals to the circuit level.116    
The Ninth Circuit analyzed Anderson’s holding and concluded that Anderson’s reliance 
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Honig v. Doe117 was misguided because in Honig the context 
was limited to exigent circumstances.118  The Ninth Circuit noted that Honig involved a disabled 
child who the school district argued posed a danger to other students; that scenario was not 
applicable to the most common placement issues that arise under stay-put provision.119  Further, 
in a footnote the Ninth Circuit noted that under an amendment to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(G), 
which added exceptions to the pendency provisions, school districts would not be required to 
first appeal the change of placement of a student to the courts when “special circumstances” 
involving weapons, violence, or drugs were involved.120   
The Ninth Circuit also weighed policy considerations and found that by not applying the 
stay-put provision parents would be forced “to choose between leaving their children in an 
educational setting, which potentially fails to meet minimum legal standards, and placing the 
                                                 
115 Id. (the four proceedings in 1415 are (1) mediation; (2) due process hearings; (3) state administrative review; (4) 
civil action begun by the complaint under IDEA). 
116 Joshua, 559 F.3d at 1037. 
117 484 U.S. 305 (1988).  
118 Joshua, 559 F.3d at 1039 (“Andersen was too quick to take language from Honig outside of the limited context of 
the exigency argument before the Supreme Court.”).    
119 Id. at 1038.  
  
120 Id. at 1039 fn. 1.  
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child in private school at their own cost.”121  The Ninth Circuit remanded to the district court to 
determine the amount the district owed the disabled student while the appeal was pending.122 
 The most recent decision that emphasized the current split of authority came from the 
Third Circuit.123  The Third Circuit held in M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist. that the stay-put provision of 
IDEA applies through the end of the entire appeal process.124  The Third Circuit had to decide 
two issues of first impression.125  The first was whether the timing of the claim seeking payment 
was timely when filed after a court has ruled in favor of the district,126 and the second was 
whether the right to the funding extended through the entirety of a judicial appeal.127  The 
proceedings began with plaintiff’s parents bringing a complaint against the district alleging 
among other things that the district failed to provide their child with an appropriate IEP and as a 
result denied FAPE.128  Plaintiffs enrolled their child in a private school and sought 
reimbursement from the school district for the second-grade private tuition.129  The 
administrative hearing officer did find the school district denied Plaintiff of FAPE for the second 
grade.130  Two years later, the district court reversed the administrative decision finding that the 
school did provide Plaintiff with FAPE.131  After the district’s decision, Plaintiffs requested 
                                                 
121 Id. at 1040.   
 
122 Id.  
 
123 M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 112, 125 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 
124 Id. at 125. 
 
125 Id. at 112 
126 Id.  
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 115; 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2004).  
 
129 Id. 
130 M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 112, 115 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 
131Id. 
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payment of tuition from the date of first administrative decision through appeal pursuant IDEA’s 
stay-put provision, which the school district denied, and plaintiffs filed an appeal to the Third 
Circuit.132  
The Third Circuit began by emphasizing that the “stay-put rule [] requires that the child’s 
placement under the IDEA at the time a disagreement arises between the parents and the school 
district…be protected while the dispute is pending.”133    The Third Circuit found that the school 
district was required to pay once the administrative hearing officer found that the private school 
placement was appropriate.134 The court found that the placement switched by law from public to 
private when the administrative hearing officer found the private setting appropriate.135   
Holding that the right to reimbursement proceeded through the appeal, the court noted 
that the “protective purposes” of the provision and the language of the statute itself supported the 
conclusion that Congress intended for the stay-put placement to remain until all proceedings, 
including all appeals.136 The court read the statute broadly, specifically, the word “any” in “the 
pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section.”137 By including civil actions 
“in a district court,”138 the court reasoned that Congress must have meant to include appeals to 
the circuit courts.139   
                                                 
132 Id. at 116. 
 
133 Id. at 118.  
 
134 Id. at 119.   
135 M.R., 744 F.3d at 124.   
136 Id. at 125.   
 
137 Id.; 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2004). 
 
138 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2004). 
139 M.R., 744 F.3d at 125. 
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Even if the court did not find the language of the statute itself to be persuasive, the court 
articulated that it would have reached the same conclusion based on the statute’s overall goal and 
policy.140  Emphasizing that the Third Circuit has consistently acknowledged that the stay-put 
provision was “designed to preserve the status quo,” the court could not “sensibly find that a 
FAPE dispute” is completely resolved until all proceedings were completed.  As a result of the 
decision, the school district, Ridley, petitioned for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.  
 State courts have also weighed in on the issue of what the stay-put provision 
encompasses.  In N. Kitsap Sch. Dist. v. K.W. ex rel. C.W., the court noted that the Anderson 
holding did not coincide with the Congressional intent of IDEA because the policy of IDEA was 
that students remain in place during disputes and not be shuffled from school to school while the 
proceedings were resolved.141  The Kitsap court correctly indicated that the Anderson decision 
would limit the district’s financial liability to just the “trial court proceedings.”142 As a result of 
the narrow reading of section 1415 by the Anderson court, the court opined that children would 
be forced out of the private school setting to the public even if the dispute continued to the 
appeal process.143 
 
b. Supreme Court Precedent 
                                                 
140 Id.  
 
 
 
141 123 P.3d 469, 482 (2005) (holding in Andersen does not follow the general policy behind IDEA, which is to keep 
from disturbing the child throughout the statutory process designed to resolve disputes between the school district 
and the child's parents or guardians over where the child can receive the appropriate educational opportunities.) 
142 Id. at 483 (“Essentially, the Andersen decision suggests that a school district's maximum exposure to the costs of 
private special education is only through the trial court proceedings.”) 
  
 
143 Id. at 482. 
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 The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of disabled students receiving free 
appropriate education.  The Supreme Court in 1985 heard the case of School Comm. Of 
Burlington v. Dep’t of Education.144  The Court decided the issue of whether a school district 
would be required to reimburse parents of a disabled child who was placed in private school after 
deciding the IEP was inappropriate and later “the court ultimately determines that such 
placement, rather than [the one] proposed [in the] IEP, is proper under the Act.”145  The Court 
held in the affirmative that when a court determines that the private school placement was 
appropriate and that the IEP’s public school placement was not, the school officials would be 
required to develop an IEP that included private schooling and was paid for by the district.146              
The court emphasized that to hold otherwise would deprive the child of a free appropriate 
public education, which they are entitled to under 20 U.S.C. § 1401.147  The court stressed that 
because of the length of time a “final judicial decision” takes it would be unjust to have parents 
bear the cost if ultimately, it was determined the private setting was appropriate.148  To hold 
otherwise and not provide reimbursement would deprive the student of FAPE and contravene 
with Congress’ intent.149   
The court further reasoned that since there had been an administrative decision after the 
parents appealed the IEP that found that the private school placement was appropriate, 
reimbursement was appropriate.150  Determining that the parents had not violated the 
“conditional command of § 1415(e)(3) that ‘the child shall remain in the then current educational 
placement,’” the court also found that they had not waived any reimbursement rights by 
                                                 
144 471 U.S. 359 (1985). 
145 Id. at 369. 
146 Id. at 370. 
147 Id.  
148 Id. at 371. 
149 School Comm. Of Burlington v. Dep’t of Education, 471 U.S. 359, 371 (1985).  
150 Id. at 372.  
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enrolling their son in the private school.151  The court pointed out that had the parents made the 
decision to move the child and had the court determined later that the appropriate placement was 
in fact the public school, the parents would have been barred from receiving reimbursement.152  
Ultimately, the court unanimously held that the act granted courts the “power to order school 
authorities to reimburse parents” for private school expenses if the court found that the private 
school placement instead of the placement as proposed in the IEP was proper.153 
   The stay-put provision has also been litigated to the Supreme Court in a case that 
involved students trying to enforce the stay-put provision in the public school.154 One of the main 
issues before the court in Honig v. Doe was whether the public school could exclude a disabled 
student from school because he was considered dangerous or disruptive under the Education of 
the Handicapped Act, today known as IDEA.155  The Supreme Court refused to read a 
“dangerousness exception” into the act that would allow the displacement of the student from 
current educational setting of the public school.156 The Supreme Court held that any suspension 
that lasted more than ten days would be considered a “change in placement.”157  The court 
emphasized that the act’s main purpose was to prevent exclusion of disabled children from the 
schools.158   However, should the schools seek exclusion by the courts to exclude a particularly 
dangerous student that would be proper.159 Congress after this case did amend the act and added 
a “dangerous exception” to the stay-put provision. 160 
                                                 
151 Id.   
152 Id. at 373.  
153 Id. at 367. 
154 Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) 
155 484 U.S. at 308. 
156 Id. at 322-23. 
157 Id. at 325, fn 8.  
158 Id. at 327. 
159 Honig 484 U.S. at 327-28 (noting that the school officials can seek a temporary injunction for the removal of a 
student they deem dangerous but it cannot be of indefinite time and done unilaterally). 
160 20 U.S.C. 1415 (j)(k)(1)(G); 34 C.F.R. Sec. 300.530(g) 
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 Both cases to the Court illustrate the protections afforded by IDEA and how those 
protections have been guarded by the Court.     Moreover, the importance of students receiving 
FAPE and staying in current placements when disputes arise have been emphasized by the Court 
in both cases.   
IV. Analysis 
a. The Objective of IDEA supports the stay-put provision being placed throughout the 
entire Appeal Process 
Protecting the disabled and providing them with access to free appropriate education 
were the primary goals of IDEA.161   By not including the stay-put protection in the entire 
appeals process, disabled students would be stripped of the Act’s protection.  Furthermore, they 
would not be provided with FAPE.  It would also be unjust for disabled students to be moved 
from school to school during the entire appeals process when the stay-put provision is clear in its 
language.  This would contravene the intention of IDEA and deprive the disabled of their right to 
free appropriate education.   
IDEA provides essential services for students with disabilities to obtain the same 
education as their counterparts without disabilities.162  The key goal is to ensure that services to 
children with disabilities throughout the nation are provided as needed.163  Forcing a disabled 
student to change placement in between appeals would prevent him or her from receiving 
continuous services.  Transitional periods in schools almost undoubtedly result in students 
having to become accustomed to their new surroundings, as well as new teachers.  The process 
of setting up and implementing the services that a disabled student requires also take time.  By 
depriving a student of the stay-put provision, the student is not only losing educational time as 
                                                 
161 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (d)(1)(A) (2004). 
162 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(4) (2004). 
163 http://idea.ed.gov/ 
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they adapt to the school, but also losing time being provided services they are entitled to in order 
to receive FAPE.  
 The result of not allowing the stay-put provision to apply throughout the entire appeal 
process including to the circuit courts would also be a form of economic discrimination.  
Students who could afford private tuition would be able to remain in their current placement 
during the appeal process while students who could not afford the tuition would not be able to 
have the same choice.  The outcome could result in students with monetary means having 
appropriate education while students without monetary means being deprived of FAPE.  The 
parents of the students who could afford to maintain the placement that they feel is the most 
appropriate would undoubtedly do so.   
However, for parents without the means, the decision to keep their children in the school 
that they believe is the most appropriate would not be a choice at all.  Without the stay-put 
provision encompassing the entire appeal process, disabled children who went back to the public 
setting because of a lack of means would have no recourse after the district level.  A broad 
reading of the stay-put provision is thus necessary to eliminate income differences among 
parents of disabled students that would allow some but not all to continue in their placements 
during appeals.  
Ultimately, the protection of the most vulnerable was the most compelling purpose of the 
act.  The Third Circuit in M.R. v. Ridley had it correct when the court noted that the “protective 
purposes” of the act easily lead to the correct result of keeping the disabled child in the current 
placement until final resolution.164  The preservation of the continuum of education of the 
disabled child to preserve the “status quo”165 of his or her education is of paramount importance 
                                                 
164 M.R., 744 F.3d at 125. 
165 Id. 
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in the daily lives of the most vulnerable and underrepresented.  Most of these children live every 
day with unimaginable challenges and forcing them to change schools before a final 
determination is inequitable.   
b. The Broader Reading of the Stay-Put Provision aligns with the Judicial Appeal Process 
A correct reading of the stay-put provision would be for the courts to recognize that the 
circuit courts have jurisdiction over district courts final judgments, and, therefore, the stay-put 
provision protects children throughout the entire appeal process including the circuit courts.  
Because the language of the procedural safeguards of 20 U.S.C § 1415 give jurisdiction to the 
district courts,166 it is clear that the Congressional intent was to protect the placement through the 
entirety of the appeal process, including in the circuit courts.    
Since circuit courts have the jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judgments from 
district courts, it makes sense that the act was intended to have the disabled child “stay-put” 
during all proceedings.  When Congress enacted IDEA, they were aware of this fact of 
jurisdiction by the circuit courts.  Thus, it can be inferred that appeals to the circuits were 
intended to be covered under the stay-put provision.167  The reading itself states, “the pendency 
of any proceedings;” hence, the provision did not limit itself to specifying which proceedings 
were covered. Accordingly, giving the text of the stay-put provision its plain meaning also 
supports the fact that the stay-put provision will be in effect throughout the entire appeal process. 
Moreover, since the “then current educational placement” has been, at some point prior to the 
appeal, approved or agreed upon by the district, reading the language in the provision as 
providing the disabled student uninterrupted education makes sense.  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
166  20 U.S.C. § 1415   
167 See M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 112, 125 (3d Cir. 2014) 
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Moreover, it is unfair to limit and discourage the appeal process of disabled children.  A 
disabled student’s educational rights and access can surely be said to be worthy of appeal.  To 
limit the parents of the disabled to just the district level, is to undermine the vigor and passion 
that most parents have for ensuring their children have access to the appropriate education.  
There is no justifiable reason that Congress would have limited the right of disabled children to 
appeal to the circuit courts when the act itself has so many procedural safeguards.   
Furthermore, the option to apply for a traditional injunction is not the solution.  Although 
the Anderson court reasoned that parents would still have the opportunity to apply for a 
traditional injunction if they did not have the protection of the stay-put provision, this premise 
goes against congressional intent of IDEA.168  The stay-put provision was specifically designed 
to relieve parents of the sometimes heavy and burdensome showing that accompany an 
application of a traditional injunction.   
c. Supreme Court precedent supports a broad reading  
 The Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of providing FAPE and the power 
granted to the courts by IDEA to provide appropriate relief.169 In Burlington, the Supreme Court 
stressed that a “final judicial decision” could take years and that forcing parents to choose 
between the appropriate education or placing the student in what they believed to be an 
inappropriate placement would be unjust if it were later determined by a court that the private 
setting was appropriate.170  The Supreme Court correctly foresaw that parents would battle their 
child’s placement for years, therefore, acknowledging that the appeal process could very likely 
include the circuit courts.171   
                                                 
168 Andersen, 877 F.2d at 1024.  
169 See Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 371,(1985) 
170 Id. 
171 Id.  
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 The Court in Burlington also reiterated that Congress intended that the child’s right to 
free appropriate public education meant parents could fully participate in the IEP process.172  
Under a narrow reading of the stay-put provision, if a parent was refused reimbursement by the 
district court, but later vindicated by the court of appeals, that parent would have no right to 
reimbursement: that would deny free education.  Further, by limiting reimbursement to just the 
district level, parents would not be fully participating in the IEP process.     
d.  The Cost should not be the determinative factor 
Cost is the major counter-argument against keeping the stay-put provision in place through 
appeals to the circuit level.  While the costs are considerations, they should not be dispositive 
when deciding the appropriateness of the education for the disabled.  Furthermore, if the school 
district provides the appropriate education to the disabled, they will not have to shoulder the cost 
later of private school because parents would not have to seek an alternative to public schools.   
Besides the cost will not always be a factor because the appeal could also be parents 
appealing to keep their child in a mainstream public school setting.  The stay-put provision 
protects the “then-current placement”, and that could be a public or a private one.  The 
development of IDEA initially was to maintain disabled children in the public schools.  The stay-
put provision can be used by parents who are looking to keep their children in mainstream 
classes not just to keep them in private schools.  Therefore, the argument that allowing the stay-
put provision to remain through the appellate level would be too costly does not take into 
consideration the parents who are fighting to keep their kids in public settings.   
 
 
Conclusion 
                                                 
172 Id. 
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In summary, the stay-put provision and its protections for the disabled students should be 
kept throughout the entire judicial process including appeals.  The congressional intent in 
developing the IDEA act supports the stay-put provision remaining throughout the appeal 
process.  Furthermore, the fact that the circuit courts have jurisdiction to hear district court 
appeals also supports the inference.  The Supreme Court cases that have heard IDEA 
controversies likewise demonstrate the importance of protecting the current placement of 
disabled students.  Finally, in order to maintain stability and consistency, the disabled child 
should be allowed to stay in his or her current educational placement until the final disposition of 
the highest court.  Free appropriate public education is a right that all children are entitled to and 
stripping them of protections during the appeal process would infringe upon this right.   
Limiting the stay-put protections to just administrative and trial courts, such as district 
courts, forces disabled children with limited means to move back to placements that could have 
turned out to be inappropriate.  As a result, these children are deprived of FAPE.  While it is true 
that the circuit court could affirm the district court, by not keeping the stay-put provision in 
place, a disabled child does not have the opportunity to know the outcome.  
  
  
